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Moody's dégrade la France qui perd son triple A !

Publié par sur 19 Novembre 2012, 22:13pm

Catégories : #Economie



Moody's dégrade la France qui perd son triple A



BOUM ! La cote de crédit de la France abaissée de AAA à AA1 par l'agence Moody's. 


Dix mois après Standard and Poor’s, c’est donc au tour de l’agence de notation américaine Moody’s de faire perdre son triple A à la France. La note du pays est abaissée d'un cran à AA1. Moody's menace d'abaisser à nouveau la note de la France à moyen terme.

Selon l'agence, les réformes annoncées par Jean-Marc Ayrault ne sont pas suffisantes pour rétablir la compétitivité du pays.

Elle se justifie aussi par une perte de compétitivité graduelle mais continue.

Cela colle parfaitement avec la couverture de The Economist.


Le ministre des Finances Pierre Moscovici a déclaré lundi soir que la dégradation de la note de la France par Moody's était une "sanction de la gestion du passé" qui incite le gouvernement à "mettre en oeuvre rapidement" ses réformes. 


Communiqué de Moody's:


Rating Action: 

Moody's downgrades France's government bond rating to Aa1 from Aaa, maintains negative outlook

Global Credit Research - 19 Nov 2012

Frankfurt am Main, November 19, 2012 -- Moody's Investors Service has today downgraded France's government bond rating by one notch to Aa1 from Aaa. The outlook remains negative.


Today's rating action follows Moody's decision on 23 July 2012 to change to negative the outlooks on the Aaa ratings of Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. At the time, Moody's also announced that it would assess France's Aaa sovereign rating and its outlook, which had been changed to negative on 13 February 2012, to determine the impact of the elevated risk of a Greek exit from the euro area, the growing likelihood of collective support for other euro area sovereigns and stalled economic growth. Today's rating action concludes this assessment.


Moody's decision to downgrade France's rating and maintain the negative outlook reflects the following key interrelated factors:


1.) France's long-term economic growth outlook is negatively affected by multiple structural challenges, including its gradual, sustained loss of competitiveness and the long-standing rigidities of its labour, goods and service markets.


2.) France's fiscal outlook is uncertain as a result of its deteriorating economic prospects, both in the short term due to subdued domestic and external demand, and in the longer term due to the structural rigidities noted above.


3.) The predictability of France's resilience to future euro area shocks is diminishing in view of the rising risks to economic growth, fiscal performance and cost of funding. France's exposure to peripheral Europe through its trade linkages and its banking system is disproportionately large, and its contingent obligations to support other euro area members have been increasing. Moreover, unlike other non-euro area sovereigns that carry similarly high ratings, France does not have access to a national central bank for the financing of its debt in the event of a market disruption.


At the same time, Moody's explains that France remains extremely highly rated, at Aa1, because of the country's significant credit strengths, which include (i) a large and diversified economy which underpins France's economic resiliency, and (ii) a strong commitment to structural reforms and fiscal consolidation, as reflected in recent governmental announcements, which may, over the medium term, mitigate some of the structural rigidities and improve France's debt dynamics.


In a related rating action, Moody's has also downgraded the ratings of Société de Financement de l'Economie Française (SFEF) and Société de Prise de Participation de l'État (SPPE) to Aa1 from Aaa. Furthermore, Moody's has affirmed the Prime-1 rating of SPPE's euro-denominated commercial paper programme. The outlooks on the ratings of the two entities remain negative. The senior debt instruments issued by the two entities are backed by unconditional and irrevocable guarantees from the French government.




The first driver underlying Moody's one-notch downgrade of France's sovereign rating is the risk to economic growth, and therefore to the government's finances, posed by the country's persistent structural economic challenges. These include the rigidities in labour and services markets, and low levels of innovation, which continue to drive France's gradual but sustained loss of competitiveness and the gradual erosion of its export-oriented industrial base.


The rise in France's real effective exchange rate in recent years contributes to this erosion of competitiveness, in particular relative to Germany, the UK and the US. The challenge of restoring price-competitiveness through wage moderation and cost containment is made more difficult by France's membership of the monetary union, which removes the adjustment mechanism that the ability to devalue its own currency would provide.


Apart from elevated taxes and social contributions, the French labour market is characterised by a high degree of segmentation as a result of significant employment protection legislation for permanent contracts. While notice periods and severance payments are not significantly higher than they are in other European countries, some parts of this legislation make dismissals particularly difficult. This judicial uncertainty raises the implicit cost of labour and creates disincentives to hire. In addition, the definition of economic dismissal in France rules out its use to improve a firm's competitiveness and profitability.


Moreover, the regulation of the services market remains more restrictive in France than it is in many other countries, as reflected in the OECD Indicators of Product Market Regulation. The subdued competition in the services sector also has a negative effect on the purchasing power of households and the input costs of enterprises. France additionally faces significant non-price competitiveness issues that stem from low R&D intensity compared to other EU countries.


Moody's recognises that the government recently announced measures intended to address some of these structural challenges. However, those measures alone are unlikely to be sufficiently far-reaching to restore competitiveness, and Moody's notes that the track record of successive French governments in effecting such measures over the past two decades has been poor.


The second driver of today's rating action is the elevated uncertainty with respect to France's fiscal outlook. Moody's acknowledges that the government's budget forecasts target a reduction in the headline deficit to 0.3% of GDP by 2017 and a balancing of the structural deficit by 2016. However, the rating agency considers the GDP growth assumptions of 0.8% in 2013 and 2.0% from 2014 onwards to be overly optimistic. On top of rising unemployment, France's consumption levels are being weighed down by tax increases, subdued disposable income growth and a correction in the housing market. Net exports are unlikely to drive economic activity in light of reduced external demand, in particular from euro area trading partners such as Italy and Spain.


As a result, Moody's sees a continued risk of fiscal slippage and of additional consolidation measures. Again, based on the track record of successive governments in implementing fiscal consolidation measures, Moody's will remain cautious when assessing whether the consolidation effort is sufficiently deep and sustained.


The third rating driver of Moody's downgrade of France's sovereign rating is the diminishing predictability of the country's resilience to future euro area shocks in view of the rising risks to economic growth, fiscal performance and cost of funding. In this context, France is disproportionately exposed to peripheral European countries such as Italy through its trade linkages and its banking system.


Moody's notes that French banks have sizable exposures to some weaker euro area countries. As a result, despite their good loss-absorption capacity, French banks remain vulnerable to a further deepening of the crisis due to these exposures and their significant -- albeit reduced -- reliance on wholesale market funding. This vulnerability adds to the government's contingent liabilities arising from the French banking system.


Moreover, France's credit exposure to the euro area debt crisis has been growing due to the increased amount of euro area resources that may be made available to support troubled sovereigns and banks through the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the facilities put in place by the European Central Bank (ECB). At the same time, in case of need, France -- like other large and highly rated euro area member states -- may not benefit from these support mechanisms to the same extent, given that these resources might have already been exhausted by then.


In light of the liquidity risks and banking sector risks in non-core countries, Moody's perceives an elevated risk that at least part of the contingent liabilities that relate to the support of non-core euro area countries may actually crystallise for France. The risk that greater collective support will be required for weaker euro area sovereigns has been rising, most for notably Spain, whose economy and government bond market are around twice the combined size of those of Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Highly rated member states like France are likely to bear a disproportionately large share of this burden given their greater ability to absorb the associated costs.


More generally, further shocks to sovereign and bank credit markets would further undermine financial and economic stability in France as well as in other euro area countries. The impact of such shocks would be expected to be felt disproportionately by more highly indebted governments such as France, and further accentuate the fiscal and structural economic pressures noted above. While the French government's debt service costs have been largely contained to date, Moody's would not expect this to remain the case in the event of a further shock. A rise in debt service costs would further increase the pressure on the finances of the French government, which, unlike other non-euro area sovereigns that carry similarly high ratings, does not have access to a national central bank that could assist with the financing of its debt in the event of a market disruption.


Today's rating action on France's government bond rating was limited to one notch given (i) the country's large and diversified economy, which underpins France's economic resiliency, and (ii) the government's commitment to structural reforms and fiscal consolidation. The limited magnitude of today's rating action also reflects an acknowledgment by Moody's of the French government's ongoing work on a reform programme to improve the country's competitiveness and long-term growth perspectives, with key measures expected to be outlined in the National Pact for Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. Moreover, on the fiscal side, the European Treaty on the Stability, Coordination and Governance of the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), known as the "fiscal compact", will be implemented through the Organic Law on Public Finance Planning and Governance.




Moody's decision to maintain a negative outlook on France's government bond rating reflects the weak macroeconomic environment, and the rating agency's view that the risks to the implementation of the government's planned reforms remain substantial. Moreover, Moody's currently also holds negative outlooks on those Aaa-rated euro area sovereigns whose balance sheets are expected to bear the main financial burden of support via the operations of the EFSF, the ESM and the ECB. Apart from France, these countries comprise Germany (Aaa negative), the Netherlands (Aaa negative) and Austria (Aaa negative).




Moody's would downgrade France's government debt rating further in the event of additional material deterioration in the country's economic prospects or difficulties in implementing reform. Substantial economic and financial shocks stemming from the euro area debt crisis would also exert further downward pressure on France's rating.


Given the current negative outlook on France's sovereign rating, an upgrade is unlikely over the medium term. However, Moody's would consider changing the outlook on France's sovereign rating to stable in the event of a successful implementation of economic reforms and fiscal measures that effectively strengthen the growth prospects of the French economy and the government's balance sheet. Upward pressure on France's rating could also result from a significant improvement in the government's public finances, accompanied by a reversal in the upward trajectory in public debt.




France's foreign- and local-currency bond and deposit ceilings remain unchanged at Aaa. The short-term foreign-currency bond and deposit ceilings remain Prime-1.




The principal methodology used in determining France's ratings was Sovereign Bond Ratings Methodology, published in September 2008. Please see the Credit Policy page on for a copy of this methodology.




For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt, this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of the same series or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with Moody's rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider, this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation to the rating action on the support provider and in relation to each particular rating action for securities that derive their credit ratings from the support provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings, this announcement provides relevant regulatory disclosures in relation to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating. For further information please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page for the respective issuer on


The ratings of rated entity France, Government of were initiated by Moody's and were not requested by the rated entity.


The rated entity France, Government of or its agents participated in the rating process. This rated entity or its agent(s)provided Moody's access to the books, records and other relevant internal documents of the rated entity.


The ratings have been disclosed to the rated entities or their designated agent(s) and issued with no amendment resulting from that disclosure.


Information sources used to prepare each of the ratings are the following: parties involved in the ratings, parties not involved in the ratings, and public information.


Moody's considers the quality of information available on the rated entities, obligations or credits satisfactory for the purposes of issuing these ratings.


Moody's adopts all necessary measures so that the information it uses in assigning the ratings is of sufficient quality and from sources Moody's considers to be reliable including, when appropriate, independent third-party sources. However, Moody's is not an auditor and cannot in every instance independently verify or validate information received in the rating process.


Moody's Investors Service may have provided Ancillary or Other Permissible Service(s) to the rated entities or their related third parties within the two years preceding the credit rating action. Please see the special report "Ancillary or other permissible services provided to entities rated by MIS's EU credit rating agencies" on the ratings disclosure page on our website for further information.


The below contact information is provided for information purposes only. Please see the issuer page on for Moody's regulatory disclosure of the name of the lead analyst and the office that has issued the credit rating.


The person who approved France, Government of credit ratings is Bart Oosterveld, MD, Financial Institutions, JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376, SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653.


The person who approved Charbonnages De France credit ratings is Eric de Bodard, MD, Corporate Finance, JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456, SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454.


The relevant Releasing Office for each rating is identified under the Debt/Tranche List section on the Ratings tab of each issuer/entity page on


Please see the ratings disclosure page on for general disclosure on potential conflicts of interests.

Please see the ratings disclosure page on for information on (A) MCO's major shareholders (above 5%) and for (B) further information regarding certain affiliations that may exist between directors of MCO and rated entities as well as (C) the names of entities that hold ratings from MIS that have also publicly reported to the SEC an ownership interest in MCO of more than 5%. A member of the board of directors of this rated entity may also be a member of the board of directors of a shareholder of Moody's Corporation; however, Moody's has not independently verified this matter.

Please see Moody's Rating Symbols and Definitions on the Rating Process page on for further information on the meaning of each rating category and the definition of default and recovery.

Please see ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on for the last rating action and the rating history.

The date on which some ratings were first released goes back to a time before Moody's ratings were fully digitized and accurate data may not be available. Consequently, Moody's provides a date that it believes is the most reliable and accurate based on the information that is available to it. Please see the ratings disclosure page on our website for further information.

Please see for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst and to the Moody's legal entity that has issued the rating.

Dietmar Hornung
VP - Senior Credit Officer
Sovereign Group
Moody's Deutschland GmbH
An der Welle 5
Frankfurt am Main 60322
JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456
SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454

Bart Oosterveld
MD - Sovereign Risk
Sovereign Group
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653

Releasing Office:
Moody's Deutschland GmbH
An der Welle 5
Frankfurt am Main 60322
JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456
SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454


© 2012 Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and/or its licensors and affiliates (collectively, "MOODY'S"). All rights reserved.

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Commenter cet article

Arlette 25/11/2012 01:34

Olivier DELAMARCHE - 20 NOVEMBRE 2012 :

La Chancelière d'ALLEMAGNE, Angela MERKEL avait dit au  Président SARKOZY : 

"SI l'EURO échoue, c'est la GUERRE" ! Elle savait sûrement ce qu'elle disait en tenant ce propos, déjà qu'elle parle couramment
RUSSE ayant passé sa jeunesse derrière le rideau de fer dans l'ex-D.D.R.. (fille de Pasteur Protestant). 25/11/2012 01:53


Laurent Franssen 20/11/2012 22:31

Seb, laquelle ?

L'europe economique,
L'europe des nations?
L'europe des 27, des 15,17,12 ou des 7 ?
L'europe sociale peut être, ou l'armée européennes?
L'euro simplement alors.
Ou bien , voyons, et si on découpait au hasard pour voir ceux qui souffrent?



cfr, le mec qui vient de se taper un délire par ras-le-bol ( moi, voir article et coms' préçèdant )


Ma remarque restant valide.
Bonne soirée. 

Laurent Franssen 20/11/2012 22:28

he's moody
And You should not give a shit! 

Seb 20/11/2012 19:24

Vivement la fin de l'Europe


zarmagh 20/11/2012 15:15

La France d’aujourd’hui récolte ce que Sarkozy à semé hier !

origine 20/11/2012 05:38

Hort sujet, mais quant on vous envoie un article via le lien, on na jamais de reponse, donc on sais pas si vous l avez recu..

Octobre Chine : Un cannibal attaque en dans le metro.... vous qui avez tant parler de virus cannibal, il me semble que vous avez pas parler de celui ci.. :

Cannibal Attack Captured On

GOING TRIBAL | October 11, 2012


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